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This paper examines the wealth impact of share repurchases that restrict participation to a 
particular sub-set of a firm’s stockholders. Repurchases at a premium from insiders and small 
shareholders increase the wealth of non-participating stockholders and are therefore consistent 
with the shareholders’ interest hypothesis. However, privately negotiated repurchases of single 
blocks from stockholders unaffiliated with the firm reduce the wealth of non-participating 
stockholders. In contrast to the evidence for general repurchases, no positive wealth effect offsets 
the significant repurchase premium paid to the selling stockholder. Indeed, the wealth loss to 
non-participating stockholders is significantly greater than the premium paid. This evidence is 
inconsistent with the shareholders’ interest hypothesis and supports the hypothesis that 
managers in their self-interest use single block repurchases to eliminate threats to their control 
over the firm’s resources. 
1. Introduction and summary 
Since firms pay a premium over the market price when they repurchase 
their common stock through a general tender offer, the price of the 
remaining shares should, ceteris paribus, fall. However, Masulis (1980b), 
Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981) and Rosenfeld (1982) find that the price of the 
remaining shares after the termination of an intratirm tender offer is 
significantly above the price prior to its announcement. Dann (1980) and 
Vermaelen further show that an open market repurchase also has a positive 
impact on the price of the remaining shares. This evidence indicates that 
common share repurchases through tender offers and open market purchases 
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are in general consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers act in 
their shareholders’ interest. 
In this paper, we examine stock repurchases which restrict participation to 
a particular sub-set of a firm’s stockholders. These targeted groups include 
insiders, other corporations and shareholders owning less than 100 shares. 
We find that repurchases from insiders and small shareholders increase the 
wealth of non-participating stockholders and are therefore consistent with 
the shareholders’ interest hypothesis. However, privately negotiated 
repurchases of single blocks from individuals unaffiliated with the firm and 
other corporations reduce the wealth of non-participating stockholders. 
In order to examine the motivation behind these single block repurchases, 
we isolate those cases in which the repurchase signals the termination of a 
take-over attempt. For the sellers in this ‘merger’ subsample, the unusually 
large premium received for the block fully offsets the market’s negative 
response to the termination of the take-over bid. But for repurchasing firms, 
the payment of this premium, which averages 19x, compounds the negative 
effect of the lost take-over opportunity, and the non-participating 
shareholders suffer a significant wealth loss. We believe that this evidence is 
inconsistent with the shareholders’ interest hypothesis. The results suggest 
that the managers of these repurchasing firms, acting in their own interest, 
are able to ‘bribe’ the sellers into abandoning profitable take-overs. 
2. Sample design 
An initial sample of targeted repurchases for the period 19741980 was 
collected from The Wall Street Journal Index. For 1978-1980, the 
‘Reacquired Shares’ entry in the ‘General News’ section of the annual index 
was the primary source. Data for earlier years were obtained by an 
exhaustive reading of the annual ‘Corporate News’ section. The dates were 
then checked with the relevant issues of The Wall Street Journal. The final 
sample also met the following criteria: 
(1) No other information concerning the company was reported in The Wall 
Street Journal in the three-day period surrounding the targeted share 
repurchase date. 
(2) There were no problems in dating the announcement and the repurchase 
was not part of a previously announced plan. 
(3) The bid to repurchase the block was successful. 
(4) Daily rates of return on the common stock are available for the 300 days 
before the announcement on the CRSP file of companies quoted on the 
New York and American exchanges. 
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The final sample of small share repurchases consists of 15 repurchase offers 
made to shareholders owning less than 100 shares in the period 1975-1979. 
The range of the premium over market price offered is from 0% to 45x, with 
a mean of 10% and a median of 9%. 
The final sample of single block repurchases consists of 86 repurchases 
from insiders, individuals unaffiliated with the firm and other corporations in 
the period 19741980. Twenty-four of these blocks were repurchased at 
discounts from the market price. However, these discounts are calculated 
relative to the closing price two days prior to the offer announcement and, 
for all but one of these repurchases, the offer price was greater than the 
lowest daily market price reported during the previous month. The summary 
statistics presented in table 1 for this sample show that the blocks 
repurchased from corporations and individuals are slightly larger and receive 
higher premia than those repurchased from insiders, estates and foundations. 
3. Single block repurchases 
3.1. Alternative hypotheses 
The curious aspect of single block repurchases is that they are generally 
made at a premium above market, which implies a wealth-loss for the non- 
participating shareholders. This immediately raises the interesting question: 
Do managers act in their shareholders’ interest when repurchasing single 
blocks at a premium? 
There are numerous ways in which a single block repurchase - even at a 
premium - could increase the wealth of the non-participating stockholders. 
The repurchase could signal favorable inside information to the market, or 
cause a value-increasing change in the firm’s capital structure. For example, 
one company in our sample stated that the single block repurchase 
‘demonstrates the confidence of this management and our board of directors 
in (the firm’s) future’, and several companies noted that the block repurchase 
was being financed by loans. Some companies repurchased the block for 
‘general corporate purposes’, noting that this new treasury stock would be 
used for employee benefit plans, stock dividends or future acquisitions. 
Several companies explained that they repurchased a block to preclude the 
selling firm from distributing the block to its stockholders, thereby increasing 
the company’s servicing costs. These are all valid reasons for a firm to 
repurchase its own shares, and purchasing a single block - as opposed to a 
general tender offer - may be the more efficient way of accomplishing one 
of these objectives. Brokerage fees are avoided and information dissemination 
and collection costs are vastly reduced by reacquiring shares through one 
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Other reasons given for block repurchases involve the costs of having 
another company control a significant fraction of a firm’s voting stock. Many 
repurchases in our sample ended litigation concerning the purchase of the 
initial block, tender offers and proxy lights and were justified as actions 
which ended ‘disruptive efforts to elect representatives to the board and 
influence management’ or resolved ‘disputes that could have seriously 
affected the conduct of business.’ These costs of outside disruptions may be 
quite substantial. Uncertainty about the future nature (existence) of the firm 
could increase the costs of contracting with customers, suppliers and 
employees. Moreover, having representatives on the board of directors whose 
primary interest is the welfare of the stockholders of another firm could pose 
serious problems in formulating optimal business strategies. As Dann and 
DeAngelo (1982) point out, eliminating these outside disruptions through a 
block repurchase could very well increase the value of the repurchasing firm. 
All of the above explanations for single block repurchases are consistent 
with the hypothesis that managers act in their shareholders’ interest. Any one 
could explain why a block repurchase could lead to an increase in the value 
of a repurchasing firm. 
There is, however, an alternative hypothesis to explain single block 
repurchases. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
view the firm as a set of contracts among managers, workers, bondholders 
and stockholders. Within this ‘nexus of contracts’, one of the more valuable 
benefits for a manager is his effective control of the firm, which allows him to 
pursue his own interests subject to the arrangements made by the principals 
to monitor his performance as their agent. In this context, the positive costs 
of writing and enforcing contracts preclude the shareholders from completely 
eliminating aberrant managerial activities. But concentrated shareholdings do 
provide a tighter constraint on the resulting managerial inefficiency than 
dispersed shareholdings since the marginal benefit of monitoring the manager 
is higher and the cost of removing the manager is lower for large 
shareholders. This theory of agency implies that managers repurchase a 
single block of common stock to reduce the probability of losing control of 
the firm’s resources. Our sample provides several instances in which non- 
participating stockholders accused the managers of protecting their own 
interests. For example, one shareholder lawsuit specifically charged that the 
‘firm’s recent purchase of 293,800 of its shares from Crane Co. was made for 
no other reason than to keep Morrison-Knudsen’s management and 
directors in office’. 
The divergence between these two hypotheses is most noticeable for blocks 
repurchased at a premium over market. The wealth transfer implied by this 
premium should, ceteris paribus, cause the price of the remaining shares to 
fall. If the shareholders’ interest hypothesis is correct, managers will only 
accept a project if it has positive net present value for their shareholders. 
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This implies that the wealth transfer will be offset by a concomitant wealth- 
enhancing effect such that the price of the remaining shares rises. In contrast, 
the managers’ interest hypothesis posits that there will be no such offset. 
Furthermore, if the block repurchase reduces the threat of a take-over and 
thereby allows managers to deviate further from value-maximizing behavior, 
the remaining shareholders will suffer an additional loss. 
In the next section, we test these competing hypotheses and also analyze 
the returns to the shares of the selling companies. 
3.2. Time series analysis 
3.2.1. Methodology 
In order to test the competing hypotheses of the previous subsection, we 
use the simple ‘market’ model 
where Rjt is the simple rate of return for security j on day t and R”,, is the 
simple rate of return for the CRSP equally weighted market index on day t. 
We use it to estimate the alpha and beta of the common stock of each of the 
companies in the sample for the 240 trading day period ending 61 trading 
days before the announcement date: the day on which The Wall Street 
Journal first publishes the news of the repurchase.’ These estimates are then 
used to calculate the abnormal return of each security for the following 121 
trading days according to the equation 
AR,, = Bjt -(&j + ljBmt), 
where AR, is the abnormal return to security j on day t, where t is equal to 
zero on the announcement date, is negative for days before the 
announcement and is positive for days after the announcement. 
In analyzing the time series of abnormal returns, we report statistics based 
on two time periods: three-day returns from t = - 1 through t = 1 and twenty- 
day returns from t = - 1 through t = 18. The first time period is intended to 
capture the market’s immediate reaction to the announcement of a 
repurchase; the second is intended to capture the market’s assessment of the 
implications of this repurchase on share valuations. Because of our selection 
criteria, there is reason to believe that the full implication of the repurchase 
‘See Fama (1976) for details of this methodology. The Dimson (1979) technique, using I?,,,_ 1, 
k, and k,,, as the independent variables, was also employed. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported here, with the t-statistics on the abnormal returns being more 
significant because of lower standard errors. 
M. Bradley and L.M. Wakeman, Targeted share repurchases 307 
will not be reflected in market values within the three days surrounding the 
offer. 
In order to be included in our sample, a repurchase agreement must not 
only have been announced but it must have been executed as well. For any 
repurchase announcement, there is some uncertainty as to whether or not the 
repurchase will be completed. Before it can be executed, the agreement must 
be approved by the firm’s board of directors and its stockholders, at a special 
meeting. Also, stockholder suits to enjoin the repurchase must be adjudicated 
before the agreement can be carried out. As the uncertainty about these 
issues is resolved in the period following the initial announcement, the 
probability of repurchase for the ‘successfully completed’ sample (i.e., our 
sample) must go to one, causing a drift in the cumulative abnormal return to 
the portfolio. 
3.2.2. The effect of single block repurchases on the wealth of participating and 
non-participating stockholders 
The average abnormal return on day t and the cumulative average 
abnormal return to day t from 60 days before the announcement of the offer 
for the portfolios of repurchasing and selling firms are presented in table 2. 
The time-series of the cumulative abnormal returns for these portfolios are 
plotted in fig. 1. These data indicate that the announcement of a single block 
repurchase increases the wealth of the stockholders of the selling firm. The 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to the portfolio of selling firms calculated 
over the three-day interval from one day before the announcement appeared 
in The Wall Street Journal through one day after, CAR_ 1, 1, is 1.40% with a 
t-statistic of 2.24.2 In addition, 16 of the individual CAR_ 1, 1 statistics for the 
28 firms in the sample are positive. 
The evidence in table 2 and fig. 1 also indicates that the repurchase 
decreases the wealth of the repurchasing firm’s remaining shareholders. For 
the portfolio of repurchasing firms, the CAR_,, 1 statistic is -2.85% with a 
t-statistic of -5.82, and 43 of the individual CAR_1, 1 statistics for the 61 
firms in the sample are negative. The average 20-day cumulative abnormal 
return, CAR_ 1, 18, for the portfolio of repurchasing firms is -3.03% with a 
t-statistic of - 1.97, and 39 of the 61 CAR_,, 18 statistics for the firms in the 
sample are negative. 
While the above results indicate that a share repurchase is a wealth- 
reducing event for non-participating shareholders, they do not imply 
malfeasance on the part of the repurchasing firm’s managers. Many of the 
%e three-day f-statistic is calculated using the standard deviation of the 80 three-day 
abnormal returns to the portfolio over the 240-day period used to estimate the market model 
parameters. This methodology is used throughout this paper to calculate the standard errors of 
the reported CAR statistics. See Masulis (1980a) and Dann (1981) for a detailed description and 
justification of this estimator of the standard error. 
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Table 2 
Daily abnorrnaf returns to the common stock of 61 companies repurchasing single blocks and 
28 companies” selling single blocks in the period 19741980. 
Days relative to 
the announcement 
date 
Repurchasing firms Selling firms 
Daily Cumulative Daily 
average average average 
abnormal abnormal abnormal 





































































































































Daily standard error 0.0035 0.0039 
3-day standard error 0.0049 0.0062 
20-day standard error 0.0154 0.0139 
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Fig. 1. Plots of cumulative average abnormal returns for 61 companies repurchasing single 
blocks and 28 companies selling single blocks in the period 1974-1980. 
repurchases in our sample mark the termination of an attempt by the selling 
firm to acquire control of the repurchasing firm. The fall in the price of the 
shares of the repurchasing firm may simply reflect the discovery by the 
selling firm that the repurchasing firm does not, after all, possess the 
specialized resource that is necessary for a profitable acquisition. We examine 
the effect of merger terminations on our results in the next section. 
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3.2.3. Merger terminations 
Without notable exception, the empirical literature on corporate 
acquisitions finds that the shareholders of target firms gain when a merger or 
tender offer is announced and suffer a wealth-loss when these take-over bids 
are withdrawn. However, there is no consensus regarding the returns realized 
by stockholders of acquiring firms. Dodd (1980) reports a slight gain to these 
shareholders when a merger is terminated, but the evidence on merger 
announcements is mixed. Dodd and Ruback (1977) and Bradley (1980) report 
a positive effect, Mandelker (1974) finds no abnormal returns, and Langetieg 
(1978), Dodd (1980) and Malatesta (1981) detail a slight wealth loss to the 
acquiring stockholders. In sum, if a repurchase signals the termination of a 
previously announced take-over bid, we can predict that the value of the 
repurchasing firm will fall, but we cannot predict the effect on the value of 
the selling firm. 
In an attempt to isolate the influence of merger terminations on our 
results, we divide the sample into two sub-samples. In the first sub-sample we 
group all offers which we suspect mark the termination of a take-over 
attempt by the seller; all other repurchases are grouped into the second, 
‘non-merger’, sub-set. 
The merger termination sample consists of 21 repurchases. Thirteen of 
these are from selling firms who had initially bought the block within the 
previous 12 months and had announced a desire to seek control of the 
repurchasing firm. All of these sellers stated that the repurchase marked the 
end of their take-over plans. An additional 4 repurchases are from recognized 
conglomerates who had purchased the block within the previous 12 months 
and showed no further interest in the repurchasing firm. The other 4 are 
included because the repurchase was accompanied by a ‘standstill’ agreement, 
which is a contract precluding the selling firm from buying the repurchasing 
firm’s shares for some stipulated period.3 
The ‘non-merger’ sample consists of 40 repurchases. Thirty-four were from 
individuals or firms who initially bought the lit-m’s shares more than 12 
months before the repurchase agreement. Thirty of these 34 buyers never 
announced an intent to acquire the repurchasing firm; 4 had done so but, 
previous to the repurchase agreement, had announced that they were 
abandoning their take-over attempt. In the remaining 6 cases, the block had 
been initially bought within 12 months of the repurchase, but the 
‘Examples in our sample include: Solar Spot Systems/Bliss and Laughlin (2+ years), General 
Host/Host International (5 years), Clabir/General Host (5 years), SpencerJnitio Financial Inc. 
(5 years), Chemed/Quaker (7 years), Reece/Walco (7 years), Dynamics/Unitrode (10 years), 
General Host/Ponderosa (10 years), and Televest Inc./Berkely Bio. Medical Inc. (extended 
period). The agreement between Kerkorian and Columbia Pictures prevents him from 
repurchasing any shares or joining any proxy contest for 10 years, and, when selling his 16.5% 
stake in Western Airlines, he agreed that he and his associates would not stand for re-election to 
the board of directors. 
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accompanying take-over attempt had been thwarted by an unsuccessful 
tender offer or by a court ruling. 
Table 3 
Daily abnormal returns to the common stock of 40 companies repurchasing single blocks 
unaccompanied by a merger termination and 21 companies repurchasing single blocks 
accompanied by a merger termination in the period 19741980. 
Days relative to 
the announcement 
No merger termination Merger termination 
Daily Cumulative Daily Cumulative 
average average average average 
abnormal abnormal abnormal abnormal 




























































-1 0.0020 0.0021 -0.0289 -0.0113 
0 - 0.0076 - 0.0055 -0.0187 - 0.0300 
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Fig. 2. Plots of cumulative average abnormal returns for companies repurchasing single blocks 
in the period 19761980: 40 ‘non-merger’ and 21 ‘merger’ companies. 
The impact of a merger termination on the wealth of non-participating 
stockholders of repurchasing firms is reported in table 3 and fig. 2. For the 
sub-sample of ‘non-merger’ repurchasers, the CAR_ 1,,1 statistic is - 1.40% 
with a t-statistic of - 1.97, and the CAR-,, 18 statistic is 0.95% with a 
t-statistic of 0.63. For these 40 repurchasing firms, 26 of the individual 
CAR I, 1 statistics and 20 of the CAR ,. , 8 statistics are negative. Thus, the 
M. Bradley and L.M. Wakeman, Targeted share repurchases 313 
stockholders of these firms appear to experience a slight decrease in wealth. 
In contrast, the CAR- 1, 1 statistic for the portfolio of ‘merger’ repurchasers is 
-5.50% with a t-statistic of -7.14, and the CAR-,,,, statistic is - 10.50% 
with a t-statistic of -3.74. For these 21 companies, 17 of the CAR-,,, 
statistics and 19 of the CAR_,,,, statistics are negative. These results 
indicate that shareholders of the repurchasing firms in the ‘merger’ sample 
sustain a significant wealth-loss as a result of the repurchase. 
However, the termination of a take-over bid does not appear to have a 
negative impact on the value of the selling firm’s shares, as table 4 and fig. 3 
illustrate. The CAR- 1, 1 statistic for the portfolio of ‘non-merger’ selling firms 
is 0.73oi, with a t-statistic of 0.94, and the CAR-,, 18 statistic is 4.26(x with a 
t-statistic of 1.75. For these 11 selling firms, 7 of the CAR_,, 1 statistics and 6 
of the CAR-,,,, statistics are positive. These results suggest that the sub- 
sample of ‘non-merger’ selling firms may gain slightly as a result of the 
transaction. For the portfolio of selling firms in the ‘merger’ sample, the 
CAR-,,, statistic is 1.82% with a t-statistic of 1.74, while the CAR-,,,, 
statistic is an insignificant -0.40’;/,. For these 17 companies, 9 of the 
CAR-,., statistics and 8 of the CAR_,,,8 statistics are positive. Thus, it 
appears that any negative effect of the merger termination on the value of the 
selling firm is more than offset by the premium paid by the repurchasing 
firm. 
For the portfolio of ‘non-merger’ repurchasing firms, the 1.4% loss in value 
of the non-participating shares in the three days surrounding the block 
repurchase is inconsistent with the shareholders’ interest hypothesis and 
provides some support - albeit weak since the relevant t-statistic is - 1.97 
- for the managers’ interest hypothesis. The evidence from the portfolio of 
‘merger’ repurchasing firms is less clear, since the substantial wealth-loss 
sustained by the non-participating stockholders may be caused by a ‘merger 
termination’ effect. In the next section, we concentrate on isolating the effect 
of a take-over termination by analyzing the returns, net of the repurchase 
premium, to participating and non-participating shareholders. 
3.3. Cross-sectional analysis 
The cross-sectional means of the fraction of the firm’s shares repurchased, 
F, the premium paid by the non-participating stockholders, n, and the 
premium received by the seller, n*, are presented in table 5. 
The statistics in table 5 show that while the means of the fraction of the 
firm repurchased, F, are almost identical for the ‘merger’ and ‘non-merger’ 
sub-samples, the average repurchase premium paid, f, is more than three 
times greater for the ‘merger’ sample than for the ‘non-merger’ sample (the 
difference is almost 14% with a t-statistic of 2.57). Furthermore, the mean 
premium received by the selling firms as a percentage of their pre-offer 
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Table 4 
Daily abnormal returns to the common stock of 11 companies selling single blocks to the 
issuing firm unaccompanied by a merger termination and 17 companies selling single blocks to 
the issuing firm accompanied by a merger termination in the period 1974-1980. 
Days relative to 
the announcement 
date 
No merger termination Merger termination 
Daily Cumulative Daily Cumulative 
average average average average 
abnormal abnormal abnormal abnormal 


























































-1 0.0044 0.0287 0.0137 0.0093 
0 0.0035 0.0322 0.0023 0.0116 
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Fig. 3. Plots of cumulative average abnormal returns for companies selling single blocks to the 
issuing firm in the period 19741980: 11 ‘non-merger’ and 17 ‘merger’ companies. 
values, 7c*, is also higher for the ‘merger’ sample (although the difference is 
not statistically significant), But if the termination of a take-over attempt is a 
value-decreasing event for target firms, why then are the shares of these 
‘merger’ firms repurchased at higher premiums? To answer this question, we 
develop estimates of the wealth-effect of the block repurchase, net of the 
repurchase premium. 
Following Bradley (1980) and Rosenfeld (1982) we note that if the 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































M. Bradley and L.M. Wakeman, Targeted share repurchases 317 
wealth transfer is the ‘with information’ share value, P,, rather than the pre- 
offer share price, P,. Thus the total premium received by the seller of a 
single block totalling N, shares at a price PB, N,(P,- P,,), consists of a 
wealth transfer, N,(P, - P,), and an information effect N,(P, - PO). Similarly, 
the post-repurchase share price, P,, of the remaining shares, (No -NJ, will 
reflect both the wealth transferred, (No-N,). (P, - P,), and the information 
effect, (No-NJ .(P, - P,). 
The informational impact of the repurchase on the total value of the 
repurchasing firm, N,(P, -PO), can be reformulated as 
No(P1 - PO) = NLdPl - PO) + (No - N,). (P, - PO) 
= NB{(pB-po) -(P* - Pl,> 
Since, for an all-equity firm, the wealth received by the seller, NB(PB- P,), 
equals the wealth transferred from the non-participating shareholders, 
(No-N,) . (P, - P,), we can cancel these terms, leaving 
NOV, - PO) = N,(PlJ - PO) + (No - NrJ) (PE - PO). 
Dividing through by N,P,, and noting that F is the fraction of the firm’s 
shares repurchased, we obtain 
(PI - J’dIPo = F{Cf’, - Po)IPo~ +Cl- F){(PE - f’o)IPo) .
Then, defining O_ 1, T as the information-induced percentage change in the 
value of the assets of the repurchasing firm, and noting that rc is the 
percentage premium over the pre-offer price, we can write 
8_ ~,T=F.TE+(~-F)R_~,~, (3) 
where R-,,, is the realized percentage return to the shares of the 
repurchasing firm from one day before the announcement through day 7: 
Empirically, we use the abnormal performance index, APL 1, T, to estimate 
this return, where 
API_,,,= fi (ItAR,)-1. 
r=-1 
If the repurchase premium is the only effect involved, and therefore P, 
equals PO, then the price of the remaining non-participating shares will 
adjust to reflect just the wealth transfer involved. This value decrease, 
J.F.E.m L 
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(1 -F)‘@-I,,, will offset the total premium received by the seller, F. TC, and 
f3 will be zero. If a block repurchase also conveys positive information 
concerning the repurchasing firm, and therefore P, exceeds P,, then the 
decrease in value of the remaining shares will be less than the total premium 
received by the seller of the block and 0 will be positive. In contrast, if a 
merger termination is implied by the repurchase announcement, with 
negative implications for the shares of the repurchasing company, then 8 will 
be negative. 
Since the total wealth transferred to the selling firm equals N,(P,-P,), 
the informational impact on the value of the selling firm is given by 
N;(P: -P6) = NZ(P,* - PZ) - N,(P, - PO), 
where all of the variables are defined above and the * superscript refers to 
the selling firm. Dividing through by NgPg and taking percentages, 
e* l,T=RE1,T-n*. 14) 
If the block repurchase signals positive information about the selling firm, 
then f?,,. will be positive; if the repurchase conveys bad news about the 
selling firm, then 8’ I, T will be negative. 
The average information effect, as measured by the 8-i, 1 and 8-r,,, 
estimates reported in table 5, for the sample of ‘non-merger’ repurchasing 
firms is positive, albeit insignificantly different from zero. This implies that, 
for these non-participating shareholders, the negative impact of the wealth 
transfer is the dominant effect involved in single block repurchases. 
For the repurchasing firms in the ‘merger’ sample. the results are quite 
different. The information effect is definitely negative, since I% r, 1 is -2.7% 
with a t-statistic of -2.3, and @_ i, ia is - 6.8% with a t-statistic of -4.1. 
This suggests that a block repurchase that signals the termination of a 
pending merger bid significantly reduces the value of the repurchasing firm 
beyond the wealth-transfer associated with the repurchase premium. 
The average information effect, as measured by the 8?,, 1 and &,, 18 
estimates reported in table 5, for the sample of ‘non-merger’ selling firms is 
also insignificantly different from zero. For these repurchases, the gain to 
participating stockholders can be fully ‘explained’ by the repurchase 
premium. But the returns to the selling firms in the ‘merger’ sample indicate 
a small negative information effect: the 8% i, 1 statistic is insignificant, but 
e* 1,18 is - 3.25% with a t-statistic of -2.14. By this estimate, the market 
appears to have anticipated a value-increasing acquisition by the prospective 
acquiring firm, and responds to the termination of the take-over attempt by 
slightly devaluing the selling firm’s shares. 
Given these results, the question arises: Why do the managers of the 
acquiring firm abandon the take-over attempt? One possible explanation is 
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that they become disenchanted with the prospects of the repurchasing firm as 
a take-over candidate. But in this case why does the target firm pay a 
significantly higher premium for the repurchased block? A large block 
holding gives the acquiring firm the power to disrupt the activities of the 
repurchasing firm. The repurchase at the time of the merger termination 
precludes further interference by the selling firm and may therefore justify the 
payment of a relatively high premium. However, this hypothesis is 
inconsistent with the evidence of Dann and DeAngelo (1983) who find that 
the CAR-,,, for their sample of 19 standstill agreements unaccompanied by 
a negotiated stock repurchase is - 3.720/,, while the CAR_ 1, 1 for their total 
sample of 30 standstill agreements (including those accompanied by a 
negotiated stock repurchase) is -4.39x, i.e., assuming that the standstill 
agreement is tantamount to a merger termination, an accompanying 
repurchase does not appear to generate wealth for the non-participating 
stockholders. 
An alternative explanation is that, although the proposed acquisition is a 
positive net present value project, the managers of the acquiring firm are 
induced to abandon their take-over plans and sell their holding because of 
the significant premium offered by the managers of the repurchasing firm. By 
repurchasing this block, these managers secure greater control of the 
repurchasing firm at the expense of their remaining stockholders. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the evidence presented above. 
To summarize, we consider that the data presented in table 5 are 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the managers of repurchasing firms are 
acting in their stockholder’s interest - particularly when the repurchase 
signals the termination of a take-over attempt, In such a case, the data 
suggest that the intent of the managers of repurchasing firms in repurchasing 
the block is to thwart a profitable take-over, presumably to enhance their 
own welfare. 
As a final test of the effects of a merger termination, we combine the 
‘merger’ and ‘non-merger’ samples and regress the change in wealth of the 
stockholders on the total premium paid, N,(P,-PO), and a ‘merger’ dummy 
variable, with a value of 1 if the observation is in the ‘merger’ sample and 0 
otherwise. The dependent variable in the repurchasing regression is the 
change in wealth of the non-participating shareholders, A W, and the 
dependent variable in the selling regression is the change in wealth of the 
stockholders of the selling company, d W*. Empirically, A W is the pre- 
announcement value of the non-participating shares, (No - N,)P,, multiplied 
by API~,,,B and AW* is Ng. P;. AP15,,,8. Thus, we run the following 
cross-sectional regressions: 
d W = y,, + y,(repurchase premium) + yz(‘merger’) 
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d W* = yz + y:(repurchase premium) + yq(‘merger’) + E*. (6) 
If these regressions are correctly specified, we expect y1 = - 1 and y: = 1. In 
addition, the estimates of y2 and yz will give an indication of the effect of a 
merger termination on the value of the repurchasing and selling firms, 
respectively. 
The results of the cross-section regressions specified above are reported in 
table 6. The repurchase premium coefficients for the repurchasing and selling 
firms, ji and 77, are insignificantly different from their theoretical values of 
- 1 and 1, respectively. The estimated constants of the regressions indicate 
that, on average, the repurchasing shareholders lose an additional 
$3.4 million and the selling shareholders gain an additional $29.5 million 
(although the r-statistics in both cases are insignificant). But more 
importantly, the significantly negative ‘merging’ dummy variables indicate 
that repurchases that mark the termination of a take-over attempt reduce the 
values of both firms, abstracting from the repurchase premium. This loss 
averages $10.1 million for repurchasing shareholders and $47.1 million for 
selling shareholders. 
An additional variable in the repurchasing equation, the fraction 
repurchased, is marginally significant. We interpret its positive coefficient to 
imply that the remaining shareholders are better off if the given level of 
premium is paid for a larger rather than a smaller block. We also included a 
leverage measure in eq. (5) since bondholders may have a portion of the 
wealth transferred to the seller, reducing the loss of the remaining 
shareholders. However, we found the coefficient on this variable to be 
insignificantly different from zero. 
Since standstill agreements are often associated with merger terminations, 
they may be synonymous with the announcement of the termination of a 
take-over bid. To test this hypothesis, we include a standstill dummy 
variable, with a value of 1 if a standstill agreement is signed, in the 
‘repurchasing firms’ regression. The coefficient reported in table 6 is 
insignificantly different from zero. For our sample of single block 
repurchases, this suggests that the news of the merger termination and the 
announcement of a standstill agreement have the same informational content. 
4. ‘Insider’ repurchases 
In his study of secondary distributions of large blocks, Scholes (1972) finds 
that when corporations and corporate officers sell a block of shares, the 
average abnormal return to the remaining shares on the day of the sale is 
- 1.1% and the cumulative average abnormal return from the day of the sale 
to 10 days after the secondary distribution is -2.1%. He interprets this 
wealth loss as a rc:iction h! the market to the disclosure of the identity of 
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the sellers - ‘insiders’ who are presumed to possess adverse information. 
The purpose of this section is to complement Scholes’s results by analyzing 
the sales of blocks by corporate officers to their own companies. 
Table 7 
Daily abnormal returns to the common stock of 25 companies repurchasing single 
blocks from insiders in the period 1975-1980. 
Days relative to Average Cumulative 
the announcement abnormal average 






































-1 0.0109 0.0527 
0 0.0077 0.0604 
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3-day standard error 





The summary statistics for our sample of 15 repurchases from corporate 
officers and 10 repurchases from the estates of deceased corporate officers 
and from foundations created by such insiders are presented in table 1. The 
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times series methodology discussed in section 3 is used to examine these 
repurchases. We analyzed the sub-groups separately, but the results were 
identical for the two groups. Therefore, we combined the data into 
‘insiders’ sample and report results for this entire group. 
one 
FIRMS REPURCHASING FROM INSIDERS 
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Fig. 4. Plot of cumulative average abnormal returns for 25 companies repurchasing single 
blocks from insiders in the period 1975-l 980. 
The market reaction to the announcement of block repurchases from 
insiders is shown in table 7 and fig. 4. This reaction is significantly different 
from that presented in section 3 for single block repurchases. Rather than 
being negative, as implied by the repurchase premium, the CAR_ 1, 1 statistic 
is 1.21% with a t-statistic of 1.15, and the CAR_,,,, statistic is 1.00% with a 
t-statistic of 0.38. Furthermore, the cross-sectional analysis of the change in 
asset values, net of the repurchase premium, confirms the existence of an 
offsetting positive effect: our estimate of the information effect, 8_ i, i, is 
1.72% with a t-statistic of 1.61. 
This slight wealth gain is especially interesting when contrasted to the 
wealth loss reported by Scholes. If the market cannot costlessly differentiate 
between sales by insiders possessing adverse economic information and sales 
by insiders for purely portfolio reasons, then the price of the remaining 
shares may decrease in the short-run even when the insider sale is part of a 
portfolio rebalancing strategy. In such an instance, repurchase of the insider 
block by the company may solve the asymmetric information problem 
involved by signaling the absence of adverse economic information to the 
market. In response to this signal, the price of the remaining shares will not 
fall, and may indeed rise. In contrast, a decision by the company not to 
repurchase a block from an insider before it is offered to the market through 
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a secondary distribution may confirm that adverse economic information is 
involved. 
5. Repurchases of small shareholdings 
Companies consistently justify their offer to repurchase small 
shareholdings as an effort to reduce the costs of mailing dividend checks, 
annual and quarterly reports, proxy statements or other literature to 
shareholders. In order to test this hypothesis, we use the standard cumulative 
abnormal return analysis described in section 3. 
Table 8 
Daily abnormal returns to the common stock of 15 companies repurchasing small 
shareholdings in the period 1975-1979. 












































-I 0.0125 0.0242 
0 - 0.0020 0.0223 






































“The daily standard error of the portfolio abnormal return in the estimation 
period is 0.0070. 
bNot applicable. 
M. Bradley and L.M. Wakeman, Targeted share repurchases 325 
The average abnormal return for day t and the cumulative average 
abnormal return to day t from 60 days before the announcement for the 
portfolio of companies repurchasing small shareholdings are presented in 
table 8. The time-series of the cumulative abnormal return for this portfolio 
is plotted in fig. 5. 
z, FIRMS REPURCHASING SMALL SHAREHOLDINGS 
3 I? 0.100 7 
yd 0.050- 
t== 
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Fig. 5. Plot of cumulative average abnormal returns for 15 firms repurchasing small 
shareholdings in the period 1975-1979. 
There is a positive average abnormal return of 1.25% on the day before 
the announcement and the abnormal return for the three days surrounding 
the announcement is 0.92% with t-statistics of 1.78 and 0.90, respectively. 
This evidence weakly favors the hypothesis that companies, in repurchasing 
small shareholdings, decrease shareholder servicing costs. This suggests that 
one of the reasons given for large block repurchases - to reduce servicing 
costs - is consistent with the shareholders’ interest hypothesis. However, 
several colleagues have pointed out that the one-day return of 1.25% is quite 
large compared with a priori estimates of the decrease in servicing costs. The 
result is therefore also consistent with the hypothesis that managers are using 
the small shareholding repurchase to signal positive information to the 
market. 
6. Conclusions 
Several authors have studied the wealth effects of the various forms of 
share repurchases. The results of these studies are reported in table 9. 
Analyzing intratirm tender offers, Masulis (1980b), Dann (1981), Vermaelen 
(1981) and Rosenfeld (1982) all find that the average value of the remaining 
shares, rather than falling by 4% to reflect the premium paid to the tendering 
shareholders, actually rises by 15% as a result of the repurchase. Although 
they disagree as to the cause of this off-setting positive wealth effect, they all 
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hypothesis. Vermaelen’s (1981) results for open market repurchases and our 
results for targeted repurchases from insiders and small shareholders are 
consistent with this conclusion. 
The data presented in this paper and in Dann and DeAngelo (1983) 
indicate that the repurchase of a single block implies an average wealth loss 
of l-2’% for the remaining stockholders of the repurchasing firm. But our 
evidence reveals no off-setting positive effects. Indeed, the wealth loss of the 
non-participating shareholders of these firms is significantly greater: Dann 
and DeAngelo document a 6% loss and we find a 4% loss in value. 
Moreover, our results show that this wealth-loss is much greater (13%) for 
repurchases that mark the termination of a take-over bid. While a greater 
wealth-loss is to be expected in the wake of the termination of a take-over 
bid, the fact that these repurchases are effected at significantly higher 
premiums appears to be inconsistent with the shareholders’ interest 
hypothesis. 
The evidence presented in this paper is consistent with the hypothesis that 
a single block repurchase from another corporation is used by the managers 
of the repurchasing firm to eliminate a threat to their control over the firm. 
In a sense, they use the repurchase premium to bribe the selling stockholder 
into giving up his interest in the firm and, by implication, cease monitoring 
the firm’s activities. As a result, the managers of the repurchasing firm are 
able to pursue an operating strategy that is more in line with their own 
interests and less in line with those of their stockholders. 
It must be stressed that we do not view this evidence as a blanket 
indictment against the shareholders’ interest hypothesis. Indeed, a block 
repurchase from another corporation is a relatively rare event. Nevertheless, 
based on our analysis, we conclude that these transactions do not generally 
enhance the welfare of the stockholders of the repurchasing firm. This raises 
an interesting question as to why boards of directors and shareholders vote 
their approval for such repurchases. We found that, for our sample, six 
lawsuits had been tiled by shareholders attempting to thwart single block 
repurchases. In one case, the company responded by converting the 
repurchase into a general tender offer. In the other five cases, however, the 
managers of the repurchasing firm argued that the premium was justified in 
order to remove from the company ‘outside influences inimical to the 
shareholders’ best interests’. The courts were sympathetic to this argument 
and consistently ruled in favor of the managers. The evidence presented in 
this paper casts serious doubt on the wisdom of these judicial rulings. 
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